No Argument Against Punishment
I’m not interested in arguing against punishment’s justifiability. I am taking two things to be true:
that it is at least concievable that punishment is unjustifiable; and
punishment is punishment (as opposed to something else, like discipline or rehabilitation) only if part of it’s rationale is backwards looking — namely, looking back to the wrongdoing being punished.
The first premise might seem bold, but it is less bold in the context of the second.
If punishment is unjustifiable, it’s still possible something that looks like punishment is justifiable. All that’s requied is that the justification depends wholly on forward-looking considerations (eg, protecting the public in the future, rehabilitating the wrongdoer), etc. If punishment is unjustifiable, we might justifiably discipline our children. We might justifiably detain people to protect others. We might justifiably rehabilitate people. What we give up is this: looking back to past wrongdoing as a reason for the infliction of harm or suffering (now or in the future).
Why does this matter? I’ll begin taking up that question next.
For now, first consider what might not change. What sorts of reasons might justify punishment-like practices even if punishment is unjustifiable? The following broad categories come to mind:
If stopping the practice of punishment would lead to sufficiently negative consequences, that might justify the practice. (This is a sort of Rawlsian argument I’ll need to come back to).
If some of our punishments (eg, incarceration for convicted criminals, time-out for children) can be wholly justified by it’s good consequences, those practices are still justifiable. The inquiry then becomes largely empirical.
Second, what would change? What would we give up if punishment is not justifiable? Some thoughts:
We would give up pointing to past wrongdoing to justify the infliction of harm or suffering on another — or ourselves! Put another way, if past wrongdoing is a necessary part of the rationale for the infliction of harm or suffering, that infliction is not justified. So, for example, if I snap at my partner because they were late for dinner, I would not be justified. If I put myself through a punishing workout because I had an extra piece of chocolate cake, I would not be justified.
Perhaps we would give up an entire mode of thinking — namely, backwards looking reasoning. (I’m very interested in exploring the implications of this).
I suspect, upon pain of irrationality, we would also have to give up pointing to (supposed) wrongdoing as a reason for withholding benefits we would otherwise confer to ourselves and others.
Perhaps we might give up the concept of desert and deserving entirely.
